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AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH TO ANOMALOUS 
INTUITION 
RICHARD S. BROUGHTON 
 
Intuition is generally understood as knowledge or an insight, especially 
leading to a decision that does not seem to be arrived at by logical deliberation. Often 
it seems contrary to what would be expected by logical analysis. As can be seen from 
the papers in this symposium, we are beginning to understand the inputs to the 
intuitive process, among them the emotional system, especially unconscious 
emotional memories encoded in bodily feelings, and unconscious experiential 
learning. 
Intuition, however, has always been associated with a hint of the anomalous, 
as frequently people report intuitive experiences that cannot easily be traced back to 
the typical inputs to the process that we have been considering. Examples of these 
experiences abound (Rhine, 1978; Stevenson, 1970) and often involve strong feelings 
that compel unexpected actions such as abruptly changing travel plans because of a 
‘feeling’ that a relative needed them. The attacks on the World Trade Center towers 
generated a flood of reports such as one that was reported to me. It involved a woman 
who had a perfect attendance record over several years at her job in an office in one of 
the towers. She was proud of that record and had no intention of spoiling it, but early 
on the morning of the attack she awoke to the early morning sun streaming into her 
apartment and, quite unexpectedly found herself considering skipping work to enjoy 
the day in a park. After wrestling with this urge for a bit she gave in, turned off the 
alarm and went back to sleep. Of course, when she got up later and turned on the 
television she learned what she had missed. 
It is, of course, an easy exercise to make reports like this seem trivial by 
chalking them up to coincidence or embellished memory, but for this woman it was a 
profound intuition, one that saved her life. Apart from its dramatic focus, it is just like 
all the other examples of intuition that we are considering in this symposium, but in 
this case, from where did the input to that intuition arise. 
Cases like this have traditionally been studied within the field of 
parapsychology where over the decades a substantial data base of experimental 
research supports the notion that people are capable of acquiring information without 
the use of the senses as currently understood, i.e., anomalously. Within 
parapsychology and its predecessor, psychical research, taxonomy of the phenomena 
exists: telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition, often just lumped together as 
extrasensory perception, or ESP, for short. For the purposes of this talk, we can call 
them anomalous intuition, because that is what it seems like to the person who 
experiences it. 
Within parapsychology, there is a growing consensus that the fundamental 
feature of anomalous intuition is the ability to acquire information from the future, 
also known as precognition. All other aspects of anomalous intuition can be subsumed 
within this. This derives mainly from theoretical models of the phenomena (Bierman, 
2008; May, Utts, & Spottiswoode, 1995) but also from the simple realisation that all 
of the ESP phenomena do not really become anomalous until some point in the future 
when the experience is confirmed by an event or additional information arriving 
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through normal channels. Thus, the fundamental extrasensory perception is that of 
seeing the future, but not just any future. It is seeing one’s own future. 
There is no escaping the fact that these phenomena have been stereotyped as 
supernatural, but it is by no means necessary to view ESP or anomalous intuition as 
beyond the reach of science. In this talk I propose to outline how anomalous intuition 
can be understood not just within science, but firmly grounded in an evolutionary 
understanding of human abilities. 
We begin with a deconstruction of anomalous intuition following a model 
proposed in the 1940s by Tyrrell (1946) in which anomalous intuition is seen to 
consist of two stages. Stage one, called the process in Tyrrell’s terminology, is an 
unconscious process in which the anomalous information is received by the organism. 
Stage two, called the product, is the means by which the anomalous information is 
transformed into useful information or behaviour by the organism.  
Stage one is the properly anomalous part. How can information from the 
future travel backwards in time?  How can information travel great distances with no 
carrier medium? Stage one is a problem for physics to solve and there is no shortage 
of physicists working at it, as evidenced by a recent regional conference of the 
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) conference (Sheehan, 
2006) and Professor Bierman’s contribution to this symposium. 
Stage two is not anomalous. This stage involves the normal psychological and 
neurophysiological processes of the human body. How anomalous intuition is utilised 
is most definitely for psychology and neuroscience to explain, but not unlike our 
efforts to understand all the other ways we gather and utilise information from the 
environment. 
In trying to understand the stage-two components of anomalous intuition it is 
helpful to begin with an old maxim from engineering that I learned from a colleague, 
“If you want to find out how it works, first find out what it is for.” As I have noted 
when I began this quest (Broughton, 1988) parapsychologists typically have not been 
moved to ask the question, “What are these strange abilities for?”, preferring to revel 
in their strangeness rather than their utility. 
Looking at the spontaneous cases that people report one might be tempted to 
think that the communication function was self-evident, but that does not stand up to 
close scrutiny as the ‘communication’ more often than not is very fragmentary and 
unreliable. Stanford was the first to explore seriously how extrasensory and other 
anomalous abilities might serve human needs. His Psi1 Mediated Instrumental 
Response Model (PMIR) (Stanford, 1974) and its subsequent elaborations (Stanford, 
1990) speculated elegantly that anomalous intuition may be part of a system that 
gathered useful information to serve human needs, but what those needs are remained 
rather non-specific. Inspired by Stanford’s initiative, I argued that if we are to take 
ESP or anomalous intuition seriously then we had to look for the needs it serves in an 
evolutionary context (Broughton, 1988), although I must admit that at the time I was 
not able to be any more specific than Stanford. However, the ‘bottom line’ for an 
evolutionary interpretation of anomalous intuition is that it must serve to increase our 
fitness to breed, survive and help insure the survival of our offspring.  
In the decades since I first proposed the idea there has been only limited 
interest in evolutionary explanations for anomalous intuition or ESP. Taylor (2003) 
offers a comprehensive analysis of what he describes as ‘need-serving’ theories of psi 
                                                
1 In the parapsychological community psi is a general term for a range of anomalous phenomena, 
including ESP or anomalous intuition. It is not an acronym. 
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within a properly biological evolutionary context. He concludes that an evolved ESP 
ability would necessarily be limited or imperfect and would probably operate through 
an environmental scanning type of mechanism. Taylor’s scanning mechanism, 
however, is not an active one, but rather “being in a state receptive to any information 
that may serve the needs of the organism” (Taylor, 2003, p. 11). McClenon (2002) on 
the other hand, plays down what he calls ‘direct benefit’ theories such as those 
examined by Taylor, in favour of an evolutionary model based on indirect and largely 
psychological benefits that would arise from beliefs in the efficacy of healing and 
similar paranormal phenomena. 
Advancing the evolutionary understanding of anomalous intuition 
To move an evolutionary understanding of anomalous intuition forward it is 
necessary to identify specific and significant advantages that anomalous intuition 
might convey. For Homo sapiens this will be more than just knowing where food can 
be found or where predators lurk. Finn and colleagues (Finn, Geary, & Ward, 2005) 
have argued that as early hominins gained a level of mastery over the environment 
social competition between and within groups of other hominins increased. This 
generated selective pressure for increased intelligence, the development of a theory of 
mind, and possibly other capabilities such as the ability to entertain alternative future 
scenarios and predict others’ behaviour. While the evolutionary advantage gained 
must be significant, it need not be big advantage. Haldane (1927) has calculated that 
just a 1 percent advantage could spread throughout the population within just the 
evolutionary time period for our own genus, homo. A related issue, the extremely 
slow pace of evolution, is also no longer seen to be a major obstacle as scientists are 
finding more and more examples of relatively rapid evolution in humans (cf. Wade, 
2007, Chapter 12).  
If the fundamental role of anomalous intuition is to provide some information 
of the future, then it may not need to work miracles to provide sufficient evolutionary 
advantage for selection to work. It has been noted (Broughton, 1988; Taylor, 2003) 
that the dramatic examples of anomalous intuition that are sometimes reported may 
not be typical of the ‘normal’ function of anomalous intuition. Most cases are 
described as hunches, feelings, or dreams that only make sense when some future 
event corroborates the initial impressions. Meta-analyses of the more successful lines 
of laboratory experiments on anomalous intuition have shown that the success rate 
(where anomalous intuition or ESP yields correct results) is very modest. The 
extensive US government funded programme into remote viewing (anomalous 
intuition by another name used in this case for ‘psychic espionage’) was said by even 
its supporters to have yielded actionable information in only about 15 percent of the 
real-world cases in which it was used (May, 1996). A key point frequently argued by 
the government researchers was that remote viewing was not a miracle source of 
information that solved all problems, but that it was most useful as an adjunct to the 
traditional means of collecting intelligence (May, 1996). This observation can equally 
be applied to anomalous intuition within the individual—it is not a magical window 
onto the future, but an occasional extra input to our normal sensory information 
gathering and processing systems. In this manner, anomalous intuition need not be 
correct or useful all of the time, but would need to be useful with sufficient frequency 
to be seen as an advantage by evolutionary selection. The result would be that 
anomalous intuition would be virtually indistinguishable from normal intuition. 
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Mental time travel 
The hunt for how anomalous intuition would fit into the evolutionary 
development of homo sapiens has recently become more sharply focused thanks to the 
work of Thomas Suddendorf and Michael Corballis that highlights the role of what 
they call mental time travel (MTT) in human evolution (Suddendorf & Corballis, 
2007a). Mental time travel is nothing more than our capacity to imagine the future. 
There is a growing recognition that mental time travel into the past—memory—and 
mental time travel into the future are closely related, and, according to Suddendorf 
and Corballis, “the ultimate evolutionary advantage must lie with the capacity to 
access the future” (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007a, p. 299). 
Mental time travel is based on episodic memory, not semantic memory. It is 
the vast memory store of specific events experienced by the individual that form the 
basic building blocks from which can be constructed various possible futures. MTT is 
also a top-down generative process in which the memory images are arranged in such 
a way as to create a plausible ‘lived’ scenario, but one not yet experienced. The well-
known fragility of memory fidelity actually facilitates the process by allowing a 
degree of flexibility in the construction of futures. 
Suddendorf and Corballis make a compelling argument for the evolutionary 
importance of MTT. The increased behavioural flexibility that humans have by means 
of their ability to imagine, and therefore to prepare for, the future seems self-evidently 
an evolutionary advantage of the utmost importance. Suddendorf and Corballis go so 
far as to argue that our capacity for revisiting our past in memory is essentially a by-
product of evolution’s pressure to be able to predict the future (Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2007a, p. 302), which they later call the ‘Future-first hypothesis’ 
(Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007b, p. 339). 
MTT may also be uniquely human. Suddendorf and Corballis argue that the 
flexibility and generative nature of MTT is distinctly different from future-oriented 
behaviours of other animals (such as caching food, etc.) that are rooted in instinct and 
relatively inflexible. Evidence suggests this difference is rooted in the expanded 
prefrontal cortex of homo sapiens, though Suddendorf and Corballis are open to the 
possibility that future animal research may qualify the claim that MTT is uniquely 
human (Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007b). 
This is not the place to present a detailed exposition of MTT, but it is 
important to note that there are important commonalities between key features of 
MTT and anomalous intuition. 
MTT utilises episodic memory as the building blocks for the generated future 
scenarios. Anomalous intuition has long been recognized to be based on episodic 
memory. Memories and memory fragments are assembled to convey anomalous 
information. I have argued, quite independently of MTT, that the experiences 
fundamental to ESP and anomalous intuition are similarly generated, though the 
inputs to that process remain obscure (Broughton, 2006). 
Suddendorf and Corballis argue that offline processing is required in order to 
be able to combine the memories that will represent the future. In this sense, offline 
processing is the ability to disconnect the mental representational space from constant 
sensory input. Suddendorf and Corballis (2007a, p. 307) offer dreaming and 
daydreaming as examples of the offline capacity to assemble memories and merge 
these with recent input to represent the future. In parapsychology, it is well known 
that most spontaneous examples of ESP or anomalous intuition occur during the 
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dreaming state, followed closely by daydream like states. Specific individuals with a 
‘talent’ for anomalous intuition and who have been studied almost uniformly claim 
that they employ strategies of ‘clearing the mind’ to reduce sensory input and 
encourage spontaneous imagery. In addition to carefully conducted and highly 
successful dream studies (Ullman, Krippner, & Vaughan, 1989) the consistently most 
successful research paradigm for ESP, the ganzfeld experiment (Hyman, 2010; Storm, 
Tressoldi, & Di Risio, 2010a, 2010b) explicitly cultivates offline processing. It can 
easily be demonstrated that offline processing in precisely the sense meant by 
Suddendorf and Corballis is fundamental to successful anomalous intuition in both the 
laboratory and in life. 
Finally, the argument that the fragmentary and malleable nature of episodic 
memory may be crucial to an evolutionary adaptiveness that derives not from 
accuracy but by providing a fluid and flexible ‘vocabulary’ of memory images also 
finds parallels in parapsychology research. In a wide range of experiments, stronger 
evidence of anomalous intuition has been associated with highly creative types, 
having good imaginations and cognitive flexibility. While not a strong link, this 
nonetheless suggests that imagination and cognitive flexibility may be a trait that 
underlies successful use of anomalous intuition as well as adaptive MTT. 
Emotional input 
Suddendorf and Corballis allow for affective input to the MTT process, but 
almost in passing, and largely by reference to the affect heuristic (Slovic, Finucane, 
Peters, & MacGregor, 2002). Commenting on Suddendorf and Corballis, 
D’Argembeau and Van der Linden (2007) draw attention to the role of emotional 
input to the MTT process citing their own research and that of Damasio and Bechara 
(Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 2005; Damasio, 1994, 1996). D’Argembeau 
and Van der Linden note that the emotional weighting of memories contributes to 
their likelihood of entering the recombinatorial process that is MTT, and the 
emotional weighting will relate to an individual’s goals. The evidence is quite clear 
that any process that involves manipulating the contents of memory, whether it be 
decision making or MTT, will have critical input from the emotional system in the 
form of emotional weightings attached to the memory images. Previously I have 
highlighted the considerable evidence for a similar process in generating anomalous 
intuition, especially through the emotional components of dreaming and the 
generation of anomalous feelings, including somatic ones (Broughton, 2006). More 
direct evidence for an involvement of the emotional system in anomalous intuition 
comes from the line of research known as presentiment studies. (Bierman & Radin, 
1997; Radin, 2004, Lobach, E. (this volume)). 
It must be emphasized that I am not suggesting that MTT requires anomalous 
intuition. I am suggesting that if we are looking for an evolutionary rationale, as well 
as evolutionarily designed physiological mechanisms for anomalous intuition, MTT is 
clearly a leading candidate. This does not mean that somehow anomalous intuition 
tags memory images to indicate ‘your future’, but rather anomalous intuition may bias 
or influence the selection of the particular memories from which we construct our 
futures in the MTT process. The resulting future scenarios that are considered for the 
purposes of action or decisions will be indistinguishable from ‘normal’ intuition, but 
will have some degree of input from the future via the stage one mechanisms that we 
have yet to understand. 
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What is the evidence for an evolved anomalous intuition? 
The short answer to that question is, “Not much.” This is probably due 
principally to the fact that parapsychologists have not been inclined to look for 
evidence that would indicate evolutionary origins of anomalous intuition. If 
anomalous intuition were evolutionarily determined then we would expect evidence 
of heritability. There is a long tradition of anecdotal reports that suggest heritability, 
and these are backed up by at least one large survey of Scottish ‘second sight’ (Cohn, 
1994). Several independent sets of data from the ganzfeld experiments, mentioned 
above, have shown a substantial advantage for relatives when they are used as the 
sender-receiver pairs in those experiments. Parent-child pairs and sibling pairs 
demonstrate anomalous intuition far better than others do, including spousal pairs 
(see, for example, Broughton & Alexander, 1997). 
Objections to an evolved anomalous intuition 
There is one principal objection to the idea that anomalous intuition is a 
product of evolution that can be summed up in the question, “Why is anomalous 
intuition not more highly developed and more effective than what we see?” Given 
geologic time spans and evolution’s power to develop exquisite organs that can 
extract information from so many aspects of our physical environment—
electromagnetic radiation, vibration, biochemicals—anomalous intuition should be far 
more effective at keeping humans out of danger than it appears to be. One philosopher 
who is convinced of the reality of psi has used the lack of evidence for an 
evolutionarily honed ability to use psi as evidence for a dualist worldview (Levin, 
1996). This sort of argument is based on the dubious assumption that evolution is 
supposed to work according to a naive notion of what it should produce. Evolutionary 
psychology is on shaky enough ground trying to deduce evolutionary rationales for 
existing behaviour (Buller, 2005). It would be even riskier to propose expected 
behavioural outcomes for evolution. 
Several answers can be offered to the above objection. The first is that the 
anomalous intuition that we observe may be the result of the optimum functioning 
that can be derived from the underlying mechanism. We have no idea how the stage 
one process outlined at the start of this paper interacts with human biology, so we 
have no way of determining how effective this process might be at extracting useful 
information. What we see of anomalous intuition may be as good as it gets, but that is 
good enough to constitute an evolutionary advantage. 
A second answer is that the observed anomalous intuition is functioning at the 
level appropriate to an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). In evolutionary theory an 
ESS is a pattern of behaviour (strategy) which, if employed by all members of society, 
cannot be bested by another strategy (see Broughton, 1988 for an elaboration in the 
context of ESP). The balance of how ‘effectively’ we use anomalous intuition and 
when we use it may simply conform to an ESS that we have yet to understand. 
A final possible answer is that anomalous intuition may not have been 
evolving so very long. Suddendorf and Corballis (2007a, p. 312) argue that mental 
time travel may have evolved comparatively recently, principally as a result of an 
evolutionary ‘arms race’ of cognitive and social abilities driven by intra-species and 
perhaps intra-genus competition. If anomalous intuition amounts to a supporting 
subsystem to MTT, then its evolutionary history may be correspondingly short. It is 
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even possible that anomalous intuition is a competitive evolutionary adaptation for a 
species that was rapidly developing MTT capability based exclusively on memory. 
Conclusions 
Anomalous intuition, known by many different names, has been around as 
long as recorded history, and the substantial amount of scientific evidence that has 
grown up in recent decades to support its existence suggests that a complete 
understanding of what we think of as normal intuition will require an understanding 
of how anomalous intuition fits into the picture. Anomalous intuition need not be seen 
as something that is paranormal, but rather it is a yet-to-be understood component of 
the evolutionary tool kit that humans have developed. 
Mental time travel, with its immense evolutionary advantage, suggests a clear 
evolutionary pathway in which anomalous intuition might be located. Anomalous 
intuition may share key mechanism with MTT (Broughton, 2006), and although the 
evidence at present is largely circumstantial, it strongly suggests areas in which future 
research aimed at understanding anomalous intuition should be directed. 
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